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Abstract
A liberal egalitarian theory of justice seeks to combine the values of
equality, personal freedom and personal responsibility. It is considered
a much more promising position than strict egalitarianism, because it
supposedly provides a fairness argument for inequalities reflecting dif-
ferences in choice. However, we show that it is not possible to fulfil
this ambition. Inequalities can only be justified on the basis of incen-
tive considerations within a liberal egalitarian framework. Moreover,
we demonstrate that there is a surprisingly thin line between strict
egalitarianism and libertarianism, which implies that liberals easily
may end up as libertarians if they weaken their egalitarian ambitions.
1 Introduction
Liberal egalitarian theories of justice seek to combine the values of equal-
ity, personal freedom and personal responsibility. The contemporary focus
on this relationship can be traced back to the seminal work of Rawls (1971),
but it has historical roots both in the US Declaration of Independence (1776)
and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789). These
societies developed in rather diﬀerent directions, though, and as noted by
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Nagel (2002, p. 88), “what Rawls has done is to combine the very strong
principles of social and economic equality associated with European social-
ism with the equally strong principles of pluralistic toleration and personal
freedom associated with American liberalism, and he has done so in a the-
ory that traces them to a common foundation.” The ideas of Rawls have
been developed further, notably by Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989), Cohen
(1989), Roemer (1993, 1996, 1998), and Fleurbaey (1995a,b), where the main
achievement has been to include considerations of personal responsibility in
egalitarian reasoning. The dominating modern egalitarian view is that peo-
ple, within a framework oﬀering equal opportunities and respecting personal
freedom, should be held responsible for their accomplishments.1
This perspective is also very much in line with moral intuitions present in
modern societies. By way of illustration, in a recent study of moral opinions
on distributive justice in Norway, the statement that we should accept in-
equalities due to personal choices gained the support of 87% of respondents.
Equally interesting, 88% of respondents agreed to the claim that people ex-
ercising the same labour eﬀort should receive the same income, and close to
half of the sample (48%) endorsed the view that inequalities due to factors
beyond a person’s control should be eliminated. In contrast, only 12% of re-
spondents supported the view that income should be distributed on the basis
of needs.2 In a similar vein, based on several surveys of attitudes to welfare
policies, Bowles and Gintis (2000, p. 47) conclude that “...egalitarian policies
that reward people independent of whether and how much they contribute
to society are considered unfair and are not supported, even if the intended
recipients are otherwise worthy of support.”3
The liberal egalitarian view is considered to be a much more promising
position than standard strict (or outcome) egalitarianism. Strict egalitarian-
ism does not allow any inequality among individuals, and hence is not at all
sensitive to individual diﬀerences in choices. It can be criticized on two ac-
counts. First, it is ineﬃcient; second, it is unfair. The former criticism is well
known and shared by most consequentialistic theories of justice, but is not
the only reason liberal egalitarians object to strict egalitarianism. Liberal
egalitarians also find it fair that people are held responsible for their choices.
1For critical reviews of this position, see Fleurbaey (1995c) and Anderson (1999).
2The study was organized by Alexander Cappelen, in collaboration with Steinar Strøm
and Tone Ognedal at the University of Oslo. The sample consisted of 1062 individuals in
all age groups above 15 years. Further details of the study are available upon request.
3See also Fong (2001).
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The diﬀerence between these two arguments can be most easily seen in sit-
uations where there are no incentive problems. To exemplify, assume that
the supply of labour is inelastic. In this case, there is no incentive argument
for an unequal distribution of income (and hence the ineﬃciency argument
against strict egalitarianism vanishes). A liberal egalitarian, however, will
claim that people should be held responsible for their choices even in this
situation, and thus may find an unequal income distribution fair if it reflects
diﬀerences in labour eﬀort. However, in this paper, we present the liberal
egalitarian paradox, showing that this position is not compatible with rea-
sonable liberal and egalitarian conditions. We do this by establishing that
liberal egalitarianism easily collapses into strict egalitarianism in situations
where there are no incentive problems.
In the discussion of this paradox, we will not limit ourselves to any partic-
ular view on what should be the appropriate equalisandum (see, for example,
Sen (1992) and Fleurbaey (1995a)). It may be utility, income, primary goods,
capabilities or something else. To make things simple, though, we will refer
to the equalisandum as income. What is important, is that individual income
(or some other equalisandum) is aﬀected both by factors beyond and factors
within a person’s control. Factors beyond a person’s control are often thought
of as race, educational background, social environment and talent, whereas
our notion of factors within a person’s control is (understandably) fuzzier.
But any modern society makes judgments on how responsible a person is for
particular actions, even though it is hard to delineate the metaphysical or
neurophysiological basis for such an evaluation. We will have this politically
revealed notion of individual responsibility in mind in our discussion.4 Again
for simplicity’s sake, let us refer to factors considered under a person’s control
as eﬀort and factors considered beyond a person’s control as talent, where
eﬀort and talent may be seen as indices constructed on the basis of a broader
set of variables.5
So what should a liberal egalitarian redistribution system look like? In
order to answer this question, we have to define more precisely our under-
standing of liberal egalitarianism. Inspired by Rawls (1971), we claim that
any liberal egalitarian redistributive system should (at least) satisfy the fol-
lowing three minimal conditions, one egalitarian and two liberal. First, the
4The concept of personal responsibility is compatible with a naturalistic and determin-
istic account of the world (see, for example Dennett (2003)).
5As illustrated by Roemer (2002), there are a number of ways of operationalizing these
variables in empirical analysis.
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redistributive system should eliminate income diﬀerences due to diﬀerences
in talent (but it might still allow inequalities due to diﬀerences in eﬀort);
second, it should not force anyone to work; and, finally, it should not dis-
criminate among individuals on the basis of their personal choices. It turns
out that there is only one general redistributive system satisfying all three
demands, to wit strict egalitarianism. Hence, any liberal egalitarian redis-
tribution system rewarding eﬀort must violate at least one of these three
conditions in some situations.
After describing the formal framework in section 2, we present the liberal
egalitarian paradox in section 3. As a response to the paradox, some liberals
may consider weakening their egalitarian ambitions. In section 4, we show
that if, at the same time, they endorse another commonly held moral intu-
ition, they have to endorse libertarianism. Hence, surprisingly, there seems
to be a thin line between strict egalitarianism and libertarianism. Section 5
contains some further discussion of our interpretation of these results.
2 Formal framework
Consider a society with a population N = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 6, where agent i’s
eﬀort is ei and her talent is ti.6 We assume that ei, ti ∈ <, where < is the set
of real numbers. Let ΩE ⊆ < be the set of possible eﬀort levels and ΩT ⊆ <
be the set of possible talent levels. The pre-tax income function f : Ω→ <,
where Ω = ΩE × ΩT , is assumed to be non-decreasing in eﬀort and strictly
increasing in talent. Let ai = (aEi = ei, a
T
i = ti) be a characteristics vector of
i and a = (a1, ..., an) a characteristics profile of society.
Define Ωi ⊂ <2 as the set of possible characteristics vectors of person i,
where for any i ∈ N and ai, a˜i ∈ Ωi, aTi = a˜Ti . In other words, we do not
consider interprofile conditions with respect to talent, but assume that there
is a single characteristics profile of talent in society.7 In order to make the
model relevant for our study, though, we assume that there are diﬀerences in
talent and that there are always more than two people at each talent level,
i.e., for any j ∈ N there exists k, l,m ∈ N such that aTj = aTk = aTl 6=
aTm. We also assume that there exist some unproductive persons in society,
6The framework of this paper is a modified version of the framework introduced by
Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996).
7See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999) for a related analysis using interprofile conditions
with respect to talent.
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and refer to their talent level as tmin, where tmin ≤ t for every t ∈ ΩT and
f(tmin, ei) = 0, ∀ei ∈ ΩE. These assumptions should be uncontroversial to
make in the study of redistribution in large societies.
Let ΩEi be the set of possible eﬀort levels for person i, where we assume
that for any j, k ∈ N , ΩEj = ΩEk . Moreover, define emin as the eﬀort level
reflecting that a person does not work, where emin ≤ e for every e ∈ ΩE
and f(ti, emin) = 0, ∀ti ∈ ΩT . We assume that everyone can, at least, choose
between working and not working, i.e., ai = (emin, aTi ), a˜i = (a˜
E
i > e
min, aTi ) ∈
Ωi, ∀i ∈ N , but do not impose any further restrictions on the set of eﬀort
levels. Hence, the framework covers both continuous and discrete cases.
Define a˚ as the situation where everyone exercises minimum eﬀort, i.e., a˚Ei =
emin, ∀i ∈ N .
Let ΩN = Ω1× Ω2× ...× Ωn be the set of possible characteristics profiles
of society, where ΩN ⊂ <2n . The aim of the analysis is to see whether it
is possible to establish an independent fairness argument for holding peo-
ple responsible for their eﬀort. For this purpose, it is necessary to rule out
incentive considerations from the analysis, which we do by assuming that
people have inelastic eﬀort supply with respect to the design of the redis-
tribution mechanism. This implies that all allocations of post-tax income
will be Pareto optimal (as long as we assume that people have self-interested
preferences and a positive marginal utility of income). We pay attention only
to information about eﬀort and talent levels when choosing among Pareto
optimal allocations, and thus our object of study can be described as a redis-
tribution mechanism F : ΩN → <n. We assume that F satisfies the no-waste
condition
Pn
i=1 Fi(a) =
Pn
i=1 f(ai), ∀a ∈ ΩN .
In our discussion of the core results of this paper, we will show the impli-
cations of slightly restricting the domain of F. We will consider eΩN ⊂ ΩN ,
where for every a ∈ eΩN and every j ∈ N , there exists some k ∈ N such that
aTk = a
T
j and a
E
k = e
min. This says that in any situation there is at least one
person from each talent group in society who does not work, which should
be a reasonable framework for studying redistribution in pluralistic societies.
We will be concerned with two specific redistribution functions, strict
egalitarianism and libertarianism. The strict egalitarian redistribution mech-
anism always assigns the same post-tax income to everyone,
F SEk (a) =
1
n
P
i∈N f(ai), ∀k ∈ N , ∀a ∈ ΩN ,
whereas the libertarian redistribution mechanism always gives individuals
what they produce,
FLk (a) = f(ak), ∀k ∈ N , ∀a ∈ ΩN .
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These are two extreme positions, and the liberal egalitarian approach may
be seen as an attempt to establish a reasonable compromise between them.
However, as the analysis will reveal, this is no easy task.
3 The paradox
A liberal egalitarian redistributive system should satisfy some minimal egali-
tarian and liberal requirements. The core egalitarian intuition underlying the
liberal egalitarian approach is the idea that a redistributive system should
eliminate eﬀects due to diﬀerences in factors outside the agents’ control: “No
one deserves his place in the distribution of natural endowments, any more
than one deserves one’s initial starting place in society.” (Rawls, 1971, p.
74).8 In our setting this implies that all individuals exercising the same eﬀort
should have the same income (independent of talent).
Equal Income for Equal Eﬀort (EIEE): For any a ∈ ΩN and j, k ∈ N,
aEj = a
E
k → Fj(a) = Fk(a).
Notice that EIEE is consistent with huge inequalities in income as long as
these inequalities correspond to diﬀerences in eﬀort, and hence it is a much
weaker requirement than strict egalitarianism.
A basic liberal intuition is that society should not restrict the choices
available to people as long as these choices do not place restrictions on other
people’s freedom to choose (see the first principle of justice in Rawls (1971)
for a general expression of this intuition). A very weak version of this re-
quirement is to demand that no one should be forced to work. In a liberal
society, if people want to dedicate themselves to non-income-generating ac-
tivities, then, independent of their talent, the tax system should not restrict
this possibility. In our framework this can be captured by demanding that
people who do not work should not pay taxes, because imposing a tax on
these people would eliminate the possibility of choosing the non-work option.
No Forced Labour (NFL): For any a ∈ ΩN and i ∈ N, where aEi = emin,
Fi(a) ≥ f(ai) = 0.
Another basic liberal intuition is that a society should be neutral between
diﬀerent choices people make (Rawls 1971, p. 94). How can we capture this
8Interestingly, a similar view is expressed by Mirrlees (1971, p. 120) in his seminal
paper on optimal income taxation, where he points out the great desirability of finding
some eﬀective redistribution mechanism that oﬀsets “the unmerited favours that some of
us receive from our genes and family advantages.”
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intuition within the present framework? Consider a situation where we have
a just distribution of income. Then one person changes her eﬀort. Suppose
she is rewarded with more (less) than her marginal productivity. This will
create a deficit (surplus) that has to be shared by the others. We propose that
a liberal society should distribute this deficit (surplus) equally among people
with the same talent (which implies that they get the same loss (gain) in
post-tax income in this situation). To do otherwise would be to discriminate
between people on the basis of their choices.
Neutrality Between Choices (NBC): For any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and j, k ∈ N,
aTj = a
T
k and j, k ∈
©
i ∈ N | aEi = a˜Ei
ª
→ Fj(a)− Fj(a˜) = Fk(a)− Fk(a˜).
Strict egalitarianism satisfies all three requirements, but violates even a
minimal responsibility requirement that there should be at least one situation
in which a person exercising high eﬀort gets a higher post-tax income than
a person with the same talent exercising low eﬀort.
Minimal Responsibility (MR): ∃a ∈ ΩN and j, k ∈ N, where aTj = aTk and
aEj > a
E
k , such that Fj(a) > Fk(a).
Surprisingly, it turns out that it is not possible to satisfy MR within the
framework of these three basic requirements. Given the ambition of liberal
egalitarian theories to develop an alternative justification for rewarding eﬀort,
the following proposition can be described as the liberal egalitarian paradox.
Proposition 1 There does not exist any redistribution mechanism F satis-
fying EIEE, NFL, NBC and MR.
Proof. We prove that any redistribution mechanism satisfying EIEE,
NFL and NBC must violate MR.
(1) Suppose there exists a ∈ ΩN and j, k ∈ N, where aTj = aTk , aEj > aEk
and Fj(a) > Fk(a) (i.e., Fj(a)− Fk(a) > 0).
(2) Consider a˜ ∈ ΩN and l,m ∈ N, where aTl = aTm = tmin and a˜El =
aEj , a˜
E
m = a
E
k , and a˜
E
i = a
E
i , ∀i 6= l,m. It follows from NBC that Fj(a) −
Fk(a) = Fj(a˜) − Fk(a˜). By EIEE, Fl(a˜) = Fj(a˜) and Fm(a˜) = Fk(a˜), which
implies Fl(a˜) − Fm(a˜) = Fj(a) − Fk(a). Hence, taking into account (1), we
have that Fl(a˜)− Fm(a˜) > 0.
(3) Consider aˆ ∈ ΩN , where aˆEl = a˜El , aˆEm = a˜Em and aˆEi = emin, ∀i 6= l,m.
By NFL and the no-waste condition, Fi(aˆ) = 0,∀i. This implies Fl(aˆ) −
Fm(aˆ) = 0. Hence, taking into account (2), we have that Fl(aˆ) − Fm(aˆ) 6=
Fl(a˜)− Fm(a˜). But this violates NBC and thus the supposition in (1) is not
possible. The result follows.
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The paradox shows that no liberal egalitarian theory can justify reward-
ing eﬀort among equally talented people. If people have the same talent,
then they must always receive the same post-tax income. This implies, as
we will return to shortly, that strict egalitarianism is the only viable alterna-
tive. Notice, however, that both the egalitarian and the two minimal liberal
requirements are needed in order to violate MR. If we drop EIEE, then lib-
ertarianism (among other mechanisms) becomes available. If we drop either
NFL or NBC, we may adopt a number of egalitarian redistribution mecha-
nisms.9
Let us now show that liberal egalitarianism easily collapses into strict
egalitarianism if we strengthen our domain restriction slightly.
Proposition 2 Given restricted domain richness, a redistribution mecha-
nism F satisfies EIEE, NFL and NBC if and only if F = F SE.
Proof. The if part is trivial, and hence we will prove only the only-if
part.
(1) Let us show that the proof of Proposition 1 is valid within the re-
stricted domain. In order to do that, we have to show that each of the
characteristics profiles used in the proof is also a member of the restricted
domain. First, consider a˜. By restricted domain richness, we know that there
exists some r ∈ N such that aEr = emin and aTr = tmin. If we assume that
l,m 6= r, which is admissible because by definition there are more than two
individuals at each talent level, then it follows that a˜ ∈ Ω˜N . Second, by the
fact that the only diﬀerence between a˜ and aˆ is that more people exercise
minimum eﬀort, it follows immediately that aˆ ∈ Ω˜N . Hence, we know that
for any a ∈ Ω˜N and j, k ∈ N , where aTj = aTk and aEj = emin, Fj(a) = Fk(a).
We will now show that also for any s ∈ N , where aTs 6= aTj , Fs(a) = Fj(a).
(2) By restricted domain richness, there exists u ∈ N such that aTu = aTs
and aEu = e
min. By EIEE, Fu(a) = Fj(a). Moreover, by Proposition 1,
Fs(a) = Fu(a), and the result follows.
9The so-called egalitarian equivalent mechanism, introduced by Bossert and Fleurbaey
(1996), giving people the same fixed reward for each eﬀort level and then distributing
the net deficit (surplus) equally among all individuals, satisfies EIEE, NBC and MR, but
violates NFL. The proportional egalitarian equivalent mechanism, introduced by Cappelen
and Tungodden (2003b), which is equal to the egalitarian equivalent mechanism except
for the fact that it distributes the net deficit (surplus) proportional to post-tax income,
satisfies EIEE, NFL and MR, but violates NBC. See Cappelen and Tungodden (2003a,b)
for other examples.
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In sum, the two propositions show that it is not possible to provide an
independent fairness argument for rewarding eﬀort within a liberal egalitarian
framework. If egalitarians do not want to discriminate between choices or
restrict people’s freedom, then they have to consider strict egalitarianism as
the fair solution. Any deviation from strict egalitarianism has to be justified
on the basis of incentive considerations.
4 Libertarianism
Liberals in general are not necessarily committed to egalitarianism, and hence
may, on the basis of the paradox, consider weakening their egalitarian am-
bitions and seek alternative redistributive mechanisms within the framework
of NFL and NBC. But what alternatives are there? The minimal liberal
conditions are consistent with a wide range of redistribution mechanisms, in-
cluding strict egalitarianism and libertarianism. It turns out, however, that
if we combine this framework with a commonly shared moral intuition that
individuals not exercising any eﬀort should not be subsidized, we do not have
much choice.10
No Subsidy without Eﬀort (NSE): For any a ∈ ΩN and i ∈ N, Fi(aTi ,emin) ≤
0, ∀i ∈ N.
It follows immediately that by combining NSE and NFL, we have the
following condition.
No Income without Eﬀort (NIE): For any a ∈ ΩN and i ∈ N, Fi(aTi ,emin) =
0, ∀i ∈ N.
NIE is clearly compatible with a wide range of liberal positions, includ-
ing a number of egalitarian redistribution mechanisms satisfying EIEE. But
together with NBC, it implies that the diﬀerence in post-tax income between
two individuals with the same talent equals the diﬀerence in their pre-tax
income.
Proposition 3 If F satisfies NBC and NIE, then for any a ∈ ΩN and j, k ∈
N, where aTj = a
T
k , Fj(a)− Fk(a) = f(aj)− f(ak).
Proof. (1) Suppose there exists a ∈ ΩN and j, k ∈ N, aTj = aTk and
Fj(a)− Fk(a) 6= f(aj)− f(ak). In this case, given our framework, there also
exists some l 6= j, k such that aTl = aTj .
10See also Moulin and Roemer (1989) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999) for analyses
of the link between strict egalitarianism and libertarianism.
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(2) Consider a˜ ∈ ΩN , where a˜Ej = aEj , a˜Ek = aEk , a˜Ei = emin, ∀i 6= j, k.
From NBC we know that Fj(a˜)−Fk(a˜) = Fj(a)−Fk(a). From NIE we know
that Fi(a˜) = 0, ∀i 6= j, k, and hence that Fj(a˜)− Fl(a˜) = Fj(a˜).
(3) Suppose Fj(a˜) = f(aj). From (2) and the no-waste condition, Fj(a˜)+
Fk(a˜) = f(a˜j) + f(a˜k) = f(aj) + f(ak), and hence Fk(a˜) = f(ak). But
this implies that Fj(a˜) − Fk(a˜) = Fj(a) − Fk(a) = f(aj) − f(ak), which
violates the supposition in (1). Hence, given the supposition in (1), the
supposition in the beginning of this paragraph cannot be correct, and we
have that Fj(a˜) 6= f(aj).
(4) Consider aˆ ∈ ΩN , where aˆEj = aEj , aˆEi = emin, ∀i 6= j. From NIE
we know that Fi(aˆ) = 0, ∀i 6= j, and hence from the no-waste condition,
Fj(aˆ)−Fl(aˆ) = f(aj). Taking into account (2) and (3), we have that Fj(a˜)−
Fl(a˜) = Fj(a˜) 6= f(aj) = Fj(aˆ) − Fl(aˆ). But this violates NBC, and hence
the supposition in (1) is not possible. The result follows.
It follows immediately that the framework of Proposition 3 violates EIEE
if people diﬀer in marginal productivity. More interestingly, by adopting the
stricter domain restriction, we can see that the two conditions leave us with
no other option than libertarianism.
Proposition 4 Given restricted domain richness, a redistribution mecha-
nism F satisfies NBC and NIE if and only if F = FL.
Proof. The if part is trivial, hence we prove only the only-if part.
(1) Consider any a ∈ Ω˜N and j ∈ N . By restricted domain richness, there
exists k ∈ N such that aTk = aTj and aEk = emin. By NIE, Fk(a) = 0 and
hence Fj(a)− Fk(a) = Fj(a).
(3) Consider a˜ ∈ Ω˜N , where a˜Ej = aEj and a˜Ei = emin, ∀i 6= j. By NIE,
Fi(a˜) = 0, ∀i 6= j. By the no-waste condition, Fj(a˜) = f(a˜j) and thus
Fj(a˜)−Fk(a˜) = f(a˜j). By NBC, Fj(a˜)−Fk(a˜) = Fj(a)−Fk(a). Taking into
account (1), this implies Fj(a) = f(a˜j) = f(aj), and the result follows.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. By the restricted
domain richness assumption, for any talent represented in society, there is
always someone with minimum eﬀort. According to NIE, this group should
not be aﬀected by a change in the eﬀort level of someone else. NBC, however,
demands equal treatment of people with the same talent in these cases and
thus no-one can be aﬀected when another person changes her eﬀort. Conse-
quently, it follows from the no-waste condition and NIE that all individuals
must receive exactly what they produce.
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Notice that the propositions in this section provide a justification for the
libertarian position without taking into account incentive considerations. If
we do not want to discriminate between people’s choices and find it reasonable
to neither subsidize nor tax people who do not exercise any eﬀort, then we
have to endorse libertarianism.
5 Concluding remarks
The liberal egalitarian paradox illustrates a basic tension between liberal
and egalitarian ideals. It shows that if we combine the egalitarian ideal of
equal opportunity with the liberal aim of holding people responsible for their
choices, then we sometimes will infringe on people’s freedoms and liberties.
This conflict will, of course, not be present in all situations. However, the
fact that there exists no other mechanism than strict egalitarianism respect-
ing three minimal liberal egalitarian requirements within a reasonable set of
first best economies, proves that it is impossible to establish an independent
fairness argument for rewarding eﬀort within a liberal egalitarian framework.
Notice that each of the three conditions, independently, is consistent with a
wide range of redistribution mechanisms. It is only in combination, as a
minimal expression of liberal egalitarianism, that they leave us with no other
choice than strict egalitarianism
In establishing this result, we have assumed that there are some unpro-
ductive individuals in the economy. This assumption should be reasonable
within large societies, but is not at all essential. If we drop it, then it fol-
lows straightforwardly from the analysis that the marginal productivity of
the least advantaged still seriously restricts the possibility of rewarding eﬀort
within a liberal egalitarian framework. Moreover, we have worked within first
best economies, which often is seen as a limitation of the analysis. But this
is not the case in the present context. On the contrary, to focus solely on
first best economies is necessary in order to separate fairness and incentive
considerations in a discussion of how to justify rewarding eﬀort.
In sum, in line with Rawls (1971), the analysis demonstrates that only
incentive considerations can provide a rationale for deviating from strict
egalitarianism within a liberal egalitarian framework. At the same time,
we show that even though strict egalitarianism and libertarianism represent
completely opposite views on how to reward eﬀort, they share a common
liberal core. None of the positions forces people to work or discriminate be-
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tween life plans. This explains why there is a surprisingly thin line between
strict egalitarianism and libertarianism, and why liberals may easily end up
as libertarians if they weaken their egalitarian ambitions.
Taken together, the results in this paper illustrate that it is inherently
diﬃcult to fulfil the liberal egalitarian ambition of establishing a middle way
between strict egalitarianism and libertarianism.
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